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Abstract 
The author proposes a new test for financial contagion based on a non-parametric 
measure of the cross-market correlation. The test does not depend on the assumption that 
the data are drawn from a given probability distribution; therefore, it allows for maximal 
flexibility in fitting into the data. Simulation studies show that the test has reasonable size 
and good power to detect financial contagion, and that Forbes and Rigobon’s test (2002) 
is conservative, suggesting that their test tends not to find evidence of contagion when it 
does exist. The author’s new test is applied to investigate contagion from a variety of 
recent financial crises to the Canadian banking system. Three empirical results are 
obtained. First, compared to recent financial crises, including the 1987 U.S. stock market 
crash, 1994 Mexican peso crisis, and 1997 East Asian crisis, the ongoing 2007 subprime 
crisis has been having more persistent and stronger contagion impacts on the Canadian 
banking system. Second, the October 1997 East Asian crisis induced contagion in Asian 
countries, and it quickly spread to Latin American and G-7 countries. The contagion from 
the East Asian crisis to the Canadian banking system was not as strong or as persistent as 
that of the ongoing subprime crisis. However, it had a stronger impact on emerging 
markets. Third, there is no evidence of contagion from the 1994 Mexican peso crisis to 
the Canadian banking system. Contagion from that crisis occurred in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile, but the contagion effects of that crisis were limited to the Latin American 
region. 
JEL classification: C12, G01, G15 
Bank classification: Financial stability; Central bank research; Econometric and 
statistical methods 
Résumé 
L’auteur propose un nouveau test de détection de la contagion financière, fondé sur une 
mesure non paramétrique de la corrélation intermarchés. Comme les données exploitées 
ne sont pas supposées issues d’une loi de probabilité donnée, le test offre une souplesse 
maximale en matière d’estimation. En outre, les simulations réalisées montrent que son 
niveau de signification et son pouvoir de détection sont satisfaisants et que le test de 
Forbes et Rigobon (2002) pêche par prudence puisqu’il a tendance à ne pas déceler de 
contagion là où il en existe. L’auteur a recours à son nouveau test pour analyser l’effet de 
propagation de crises financières récentes au système bancaire canadien. Les résultats 
empiriques font ressortir trois grands constats. Le premier concerne la crise des prêts 
hypothécaires à risque amorcée en 2007, dont les retombées sur le système bancaire 
canadien se révèlent plus persistantes et plus fortes que celles d’autres crises récentes 
comme le krach du marché boursier américain en 1987, la crise du peso mexicain en 
1994 ou la crise asiatique de 1997. Deuxième constat : la crise qui a secoué l’Asie 
orientale en octobre 1997 a contaminé d’autres pays asiatiques et rapidement atteint 
l’Amérique latine et les pays du G7. Cette contagion, dont l’incidence fut moins aiguë au   iv
Canada que dans les économies émergentes, a pesé moins longtemps et moins lourd sur 
les banques canadiennes que ne le fait la crise actuelle du crédit hypothécaire. 
Troisièmement, rien n’indique que la crise du peso mexicain de 1994 se soit transmise au 
système bancaire canadien. La contagion a gagné l’Argentine, le Brésil et le Chili, mais 
elle ne s’est pas répandue hors d’Amérique latine. 
Classification JEL : C12, G01, G15 
Classification de la Banque : Stabilité financière; Recherches menées par les banques 
centrales; Méthodes économétriques et statistiques 
 1 Introduction
Since 1987, international ﬁnancial markets have experienced a series of ﬁnancial crises such as the
U.S. stock market crash in 1987, the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the East Asian crisis in 1997,
the Russian crisis in 1998, and the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis. A common characteristic of
these ﬁnancial crises is that dramatic movements in the ﬁnancial market of a crisis country, such as
large drops in asset prices and increases in market volatility, can quickly spread to other markets
with different sizes and structures around the world. Do these periods of highly cross-market co-
movements provide evidence of contagion? And what are the policy implications of these strong
cross-market relationships?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to deﬁne contagion. In this paper, we adopt Forbes
and Rigobon’s (2002) deﬁnition: contagion is a signiﬁcant increase in cross-market linkages after a
shock to one country or group of countries.1 According to this deﬁnition, contagion does not occur
if two markets show a high degree of linkage during both stable and crisis periods. Contagion
occurs only if cross-market linkage increases signiﬁcantly after the shock. If the linkage does
not increase signiﬁcantly after a shock, then any high level of cross-market linkage after a shock
suggests only strong correlation between the two markets. To differentiate this situation from
contagion, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) refer to these strong transmission mechanisms, which exist
in all states, as interdependence.
Given the above deﬁnition, although a test for contagion does not shed light on the nature of
the international transmission mechanism, it enables one to perceive that there are two different
channels in the international transmission of ﬁnancial shocks: crisis-contingent and non-crisis-
1It is important to note that there are different deﬁnitions of contagion in the literature. For example, some
economists argue that contagion occurs whenever a shock to one country is transmitted to another country. Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) and Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000) give more detailed explanations of the advantages of
Forbes and Rigobon’s deﬁnition of contagion.
1contingent channels. Crisis-contingent channels imply that transmission mechanisms change dur-
ing a crisis (contagion exists), and non-crisis-contingent channels imply that transmission mech-
anisms do not change during both stable (contagion does not exist) and crisis periods. If cross-
market linkages do not change signiﬁcantly during ﬁnancial crises, then ﬁnancial shocks are trans-
mitted through non-crisis-contingent channels, such as trade and ﬁnancial sector linkages.
From a policy perspective, it is important to discriminate between these two alternative chan-
nels. For example, if crises are transmitted largely through crisis-contingent channels, which exist
only after a crisis, then short-run isolation strategies, such as capital controls, could be highly ef-
fective in reducing the effect of a crisis. On the other hand, if crises are transmitted mainly through
non-crisis-contingent channels, which exist before and after a crisis, then these short-run isolation
strategies will only delay a country’s adjustment to a shock and not prevent it from being affected
by the crisis.
The most common method of testing for contagion is based on cross-market correlation coefﬁ-
cients.2 These tests measure the correlation coefﬁcient between two markets during a stable period
and then test for a signiﬁcant increase in this correlation coefﬁcient after a shock. If the correlation
coefﬁcient increases signiﬁcantly, this suggests that the transmission mechanism between the two
markets has increased after the shock and contagion occurs. King and Wadhwani (1990) were
the ﬁrst to use correlation coefﬁcients as a measure of contagion. They show that the correlation
coefﬁcient between the New York and London markets increased during the stock market crash in
1987. Also, Calvo and Reinhart (1996) ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in the correlation for the Latin
American market during the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, while Baig and Goldfajn (1998) report
2In the literature, there are a number of other ways to measure cross-market linkages, such as the probability of a
speculative attack, or the transmission of volatility. Although these other ways can provide some important evidence
(for example, volatility is transmitted across markets, and speciﬁc cross-country transmission channels are important
predictors of ﬁnancial crises), they do not explicitly test whether the transmission changes signiﬁcantly after the
relevant crisis.
2correlation shifts for several East Asian stock markets during the East Asian crisis in 1997.
However, these tests for contagion based on statistically signiﬁcant increases in correlation
coefﬁcients are challenged by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Using a simple linear framework,
they show that an increase in cross-market correlation coefﬁcients around crises may not neces-
sarily indicate contagion due to econometric problems with heteroskedasticity, which can cause
calculated cross-market correlations to increase after a crisis, even though there is no increase in
the underlying linkages. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest one method of correcting for this
heteroskedasticity by adjusting the cross-market correlation coefﬁcients. When the adjusted cor-
relation coefﬁcient is used to test for contagion, they ﬁnd that no contagion occurred during the
1997 East Asian crisis, 1994 Mexican peso crisis, and 1987 U.S. stock market crash. Instead, they
ﬁnd a high level of market co-movement during these crises periods, which reﬂects a continua-
tion of strong global cross-market linkages. Their conclusion is that “there is no contagion, only
interdependence.”
Obviously, this adjustment is based on the assumptions that there are no omitted variables and
endogeneity, and the correlation analysis is limited to the case of bivariate normal distribution be-
tween the two markets. However, changes in omitted variables, such as economic fundamentals,
risk perceptions, and preference, can cause an increase in asset-price correlations, even when con-
tagion is not present. It is also difﬁcult to control for any endogeneity or feedback effects when
estimating the effect on one country of a crisis in another. Even though the correlation coefﬁcient
can indicate the strength of a linear relationship between two variables, its value may not be suf-
ﬁcient to evaluate this relationship, especially in the case where the assumption of normality is
incorrect.3 As a result, the measure based on the correlation coefﬁcient misses a potentially im-
3If the variables are independent, then the correlation is zero, but the converse is not true, because the correlation
coefﬁcient detects only linear dependencies between two variables. For example, suppose the random variable x is
uniformly distributed on the interval from -1 to 1, and y = x2. Then, y is completely determined by x, so that x and y
3portant dimension of the contagion phenomenon, such as non-linear dependence. Consequently,
Forbes and Rigobon’s (2002) correlation-adjusted test is still inaccurate and should be used with
caution.
In this paper, we develop a test for ﬁnancial contagion based on a non-parametric correlation.
Unlike Forbes and Rigobon’s test (2002) (hereafter, FR’s test), our test does not rely on the as-
sumption that the data are drawn from a given probability distribution (e.g., a bivariate normal
distribution), so that it allows for maximal ﬂexibility in ﬁtting into the data. Our test avoids the
problem of omitted variables associated with FR’s test, because we do not impose the restriction
that there exists a regression relationship between two variables.4 Since the non-parametric corre-
lation used in our test is based on the measure of the concordance between two variables, which
reﬂects the direction of their co-movement and is not related to their variances, our test does not
suffer from the heteroskedasticity associated with the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient.5
It is important to note that, as with all correlation coefﬁcient-based contagion tests, the limita-
tion of our test is that the market generating the crisis is known and the timing of the crisis period
is given. Consequently, the change in the deﬁnitions of the stable period and the crisis period will
affect the results.
To investigate the ﬁnite sampling properties of our test for ﬁnancial contagion, we conduct
Monte Carlo simulation studies. The simulation results show that our test has reasonable size and
good power to detect ﬁnancial contagion, and FR’s test (2002) is conservative, suggesting their test
tends not to ﬁnd evidence of contagion when it does exist.
Subsequently, our test is applied to investigate contagion from a variety of recent ﬁnancial
are dependent. Even though x and y are dependent, their correlation is zero, i.e., they are uncorrelated. It is only when
x and y are jointly normal, uncorrelation is equivalent to independence.
4The problem of omitted variables in FR’s test arises from a linear speciﬁcation between the two variables.
5It is important to note Forbes and Rigobon (2002) correct the heteroskedasticity by an arbitrary and unrealistic
restriction on the variance of the market where the crisis originates.
4crises to the Canadian banking system. Three empirical results are obtained. First, compared to
recent ﬁnancial crises, including the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican peso cri-
sis, and the 1997 East Asian crisis, the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis is having a more persistent
and stronger contagion impact on the Canadian banking system. Second, the October 1997 East
Asian crisis induced contagion in Asian countries, and it quickly spread to Latin America, and G-7
countries. The contagious persistency of this crisis to the Canadian banking system was not as
persistent as that of the ongoing subprime crisis. However, it had a stronger impact on emerging
markets. Third, there is no evidence of contagion from the 1994 Mexican peso crisis to the Cana-
dian banking system. Although contagion occurred in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the contagion
effects of the 1994 crisis were limited to Latin America region.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical
and empirical perspectives on ﬁnancial contagion. Section 3 provides a statistical test for ﬁnan-
cial contagion, and a small Monte Carlo simulation is designed to investigate the ﬁnite-sample
performance of the test statistic. In section 4, the test is applied to investigate ﬁnancial contagion
from a variety of recent ﬁnancial crises to the Canadian banking system. Section 5 offers some
conclusions.
2 Contagion: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives
2.1 Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature on why contagion can occur is extensive. This literature can be divided
into two broad groups: fundamental causes (including common shocks, trade linkages, and ﬁnan-
cial linkages) and investors’ behaviour (including liquidity problems, incentive problems, infor-
mational asymmetries, market coordination problems, and investor reassessment). In this section,
we brieﬂy summarize this extensive literature.
5Contagion can have a number of different fundamental causes. One type of fundamental cause
is a common or global shock. For example, a major economic shift in industrial countries (such
as changes in interest rates or currency values), a change in commodity prices, and a reduction in
global growth can trigger crises and large capital outﬂows from emerging markets. Any of these
common shocks can lead to increased co-movements in asset prices and capital ﬂows.
A second major group of fundamental causes is trade linkages, which include linkages through
direct trade and competitive devaluations. A crisis in one country can cause a reduction in income
and a corresponding reduction in demand for imports, thereby affecting exports, the trade balance,
and related economic fundamentals in other economies through direct trade links. Moreover, if a
crisis in one country causes its currency to be devalued, this can reduce the relative export competi-
tiveness of other countries that compete in third markets. This effect of “competitive devaluations”
can put pressure on the other countries’ currencies to depreciate or devalue. A series of competi-
tive devaluations can cause larger currency depreciations than required by the initial deterioration
in fundamentals.
A ﬁnal major group of fundamental causes is ﬁnancial linkages. In a world or region that is
highly integrated, a crisis in one country can have direct ﬁnancing effects on other countries, such
as through a reduction in trade credit, foreign direct investment, and other capital ﬂows. More
speciﬁcally, a crisis in one country can reduce the supply of capital from that country, thereby
reducing its ability to provide bank lending and other forms of investment to a second country.
The crisis could also indirectly affect the supply of capital through third parties. For countries
heavily reliant on external funding, a reduction in capital inﬂows due to this effect can cause a
sharp increase in borrowing costs and put pressure on a currency to depreciate.
The second major group of theories regarding contagion is based on investors’ behaviour. In-
6vestors’ behaviour, whether rational or irrational, allows shocks to spill over from one country to
the next. The literature differs on the scope of rational versus irrational investor behaviour, both
individually and collectivelly. First, investors can take actions that are, ex ante, individually ra-
tional but lead to excessive co-movements, in that they cannot be explained by real fundamentals.
Through this channel, which can broadly be called investors’ practices, contagion is transmitted
by the actions of investors outside the country, each of whom is behaving rationally. Concep-
tually, this type of investor behaviour can be further brokendown into problems of liquidity and
incentives and problems of informational asymmetry and market coordination. Second, cases of
multiple equilibrium, similar to those in models of commercial bank runs, can imply contagious
behaviour among investors. Third, changes in the international ﬁnancial system, or in the rules of
the game, can induce investors to alter their behaviour after an initial crisis.
2.2 Empirical literature
During international ﬁnancial crises, ﬁnancial markets of very different sizes, structures, and ge-
ographic locations can exhibit a high degree of across market co-movements in asset prices. The
high degree of co-movement suggests the existence of international transmission mechanisms of
ﬁnancial crises. Three approaches are used to test empirically for contagion: GARCH and regime-
switching models, cointegration techniques, and cross-market correlation coefﬁcients.
Contagion tests that are based on a GARCH or regime-switching framework are used to ﬁnd
evidence of signiﬁcant volatility spillovers from one market to another. For example, Gravelle,
Kichian, and Morley (2006) specify a Markov regime-switching model to accommodate structural
changes to make inferences and to test for shift-contagion. Two notable features are that the tim-
ing of changes in volatility is endogenously estimated and the countries in which crises originate
7need not be known.6 The cointegration-based approach (Yang et al. 2006) examines the long-run
price relationship and the dynamic price transmission. This approach does not speciﬁcally test
for contagion, because cross-market relationships over long periods could increase for a number
of reasons. Moreover, this approach could miss periods of contagion when cross-market relations
only increase brieﬂy after a crisis.
The most common approach of testing for contagion is based on cross-market correlation co-
efﬁcients. This approach measures the correlation in returns between two markets during a stable
period, and then tests for a signiﬁcant increase in this correlation coefﬁcient after a shock. If the
correlation coefﬁcient increases signiﬁcantly, this suggests that the transmission mechanism be-
tween the two markets increased after the shock and contagion has occurred. An inﬂuential study
by King and Wadhwani (1990) examines the changes in correlation coefﬁcients between different
markets after the U.S.stock market crash of October 1987. Their empirical results show that the
volatility correlation coefﬁcients of stock markets between the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Japan increased signiﬁcantly after this crash. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) use this approach to
test for contagion in stock prices and Brady bonds after the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. They ﬁnd
that cross-market correlations increased for many emerging markets during this crisis. Baig and
Goldfajn (1998) analyze the stock market returns, interest rates, sovereign spreads, and currencies
of ﬁve Asian countries. They ﬁnd that, for each variable, correlation coefﬁcients across countries
are signiﬁcantly higher in the period July 1997-May 1998 than in period January 1995-December
1996. These tests reach the same general conclusion: there was a statistically signiﬁcant increase
in cross-market correlation coefﬁcients during the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, 1994 Mexican
peso crisis, and 1997 East Asian crisis, and contagion occurred. However, using a simple linear
6Hamao, Masulis, and Ng (1990) use a GARCH framework to examine stock markets around the 1987 U.S. stock
market crash and ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant price-volatility spillovers from New York to London and Tokyo, and
from London to Tokyo.
8framework, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that the correlation coefﬁcient underlying these tests
is actually conditional on market volatility. As a result, during a crisis when market volatility
increases, estimates of cross-market correlations will be biased upward. When their test of the
adjusted-correlation coefﬁcient is used to test for contagion, there is virtually no evidence of a sig-
niﬁcant increase in cross-market correlation coefﬁcients during the 1987 U.S. stock market crash,
1994 Mexican peso crisis, and 1997 East Asian crisis.
3 A New Test for Contagion
3.1 The test statistic
The study of ﬁnancial market co-movements has become an important method of assessing ﬁ-
nancial crises and their contagious effects. According to Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005),
co-movement is deﬁned as a pattern of positive correlations. In their paper, the Pearson correlation
coefﬁcient is the basic approach used to measure the positive correlations. Though the Pearson
correlation coefﬁcient can indicate the strength of a linear relationship between two variables, its
value may not be sufﬁcient to evaluate this relationship, especially in the case where the assump-
tion of normality is incorrect. As a result, the measure based on the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient
misses a potentially important dimension of the contagion phenomenon, such as non-linear depen-
dence. Going beyond the linear approach, Rodriguez (2007) uses Kendall’s tau, a non-parametric
measure of correlation, as the main measure of dependence to analyze co-movements, but he does
not construct a test statistic to determine whether there is a signiﬁcant increase during the crisis
period. In this section, we use the Kendall’s tau as a measure of cross-market co-movement to
build a test of ﬁnancial contagion.
Two points (x1,y1),(x2,y2) in R2 are said to be concordant if x1 > x2 whenever y1 > y2, and
x1 <x2 whenevery1 <y2,anddiscordantintheoppositecase. Inasimilarway, tworandomvectors
9(x1,y1) and (x2,y2) are said to be concordant if P[(x1−x2)(y1−y2) > 0]−P[(x1−x2)(y1−y2) <
0] > 0, and discordant if P[(x1−x2)(y1−y2) > 0]−P[(x1−x2)(y1−y2) < 0] < 0.
Kendall’s tau is deﬁned as the difference between the probabilities P[(x1 −x2)(y1 −y2) > 0]
and P[(x1−x2)(y1−y2) < 0] :
ρx,y ≡ P[(x1−x2)(y1−y2) > 0]−P[(x1−x2)(y1−y2) < 0] > 0. (1)
Kendall’s tau is a non-parametric statistic used to measure the degree of concordance between
two variables and assess the signiﬁcance of this concordance. It satisﬁes axioms (i) to (vii) for a
concordance measure in Cherubini, Luciano, and Vecchiate (2004).
If ρx,y > 0, then the concordance is higher than the discordance, indicating that x1 and y1
have more opportunities to move up or down together.7 A high value of Kendall’s tau means that
most pairs are concordant. We construct a test statistic to determine whether there is a signiﬁcant
increase in Kendall’s tau during the crisis period.
Weuse{xt,yt}n
t=1 and{xt,yt}n+m
t=n+1 todenote, respectively, theobservationsoftwoassetreturns
during a stable period and a crisis period. Suppose that {xt,yt}n
t=1 is identically distributed as {x,y}
with the distribution function F(x,y).
If we use ρx,y to express Kendall’s tau during the stable period and ρh
x,y during the crisis period,
the null and alternative hypotheses are, respectively,
H0 : ρx,y ≥ ρh
x,y, (3)
7Kendall’s tau can also be expressed by the copula functionC(.,.) between x1 and y1. LetU1 andU2 be the standard









H1 : ρx,y < ρh
x,y. (4)












1 if (yj−yi)(xj−xi) > 0
−1 if (yj−yi)(xj−xi) < 0.








where ˆ S(ˆ ρx,y) is the estimator of the standard error of ˆ ρx,y, which is,
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Theorem 1 Suppose that the distribution functions of xt and yt are continuous and that





d −→ N(0,1). (8)
Proof: We can express ρx,y as:
ρx,y =
Z Z Z Z
sign(x2−x1)sign(y2−y1)dF(x1,y1)dF(x2,y2),
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Given the U-statistic expression of ˆ ρx,y, and its limit ρx,y, it is straightforward to use a U-statistic
method to verify that the pseudo-t statistic
ˆ ρx,y−ρx,y
ˆ σ converges to N(0,1) in distribution (Hollander
and Wolfe, 1999).
Our test statistic to test for contagion is
CTn,m ≡














We reject the null hypothesis for a given signiﬁcant level α, ifCTn,m < −Zα, where Zα denotes
the number for which P(Z ≥ Zα) = α and Z is a standard normal random variable. An equivalent
decision rule is that we reject the null hypothesis if ˆ ρx,y < ˆ ρh
x,y−Zαˆ σ.
3.2 Finite-sample performance
We use Monte Carlo simulations to examine the ﬁnite-sample performance of our test. The ex-
periments are conducted to examine the size and power properties of the test statistic under two
12different scenarios. One is a linear transmission mechanism of ﬁnancial contagion, and the other
is a non-linear transmission mechanism.
We ﬁrst outline ﬁnancial market linkages in a stable period, and then extend the model to
include linkages in a crisis period. The crisis model is based on the framework of Dungey et
al. (2005, 2007), which is motivated by the class of factor models commonly adopted in ﬁnance,
where the determinants of asset returns are decomposed into common factors and idiosyncratic
factors.
3.2.1 Data-generating processes for non-crisis
The data-generating processes (DGP) in the Monte Carlo experiments consist of two asset returns
during a stable period (x1,t,x2,t) and a crisis period (y1,t,y2,t). Let ui,t ∼ N(0,1),i = 1,2 and vt ∼
N(0,1). Then the DGP for the stable period can be designed as follows:
x1,t = a1zt +b1u1,t, (11)
x2,t = a2zt +b2u2,t, (12)
where




and ht evolves according to an ARCH(1, 1) process,
ht = α+β(εt)2. (15)
In the speciﬁcation of DGPs, we use the common factor zt to capture systemic risk which im-
pacts upon asset returns with a loading of ai,i = 1,2. This could represent a global liquidity shock,
a change in investors’ risk preferences, or any factor common to both markets. The idiosyncratic
13factors ui,t,i = 1,2 capture unique aspects to each return, and impact upon asset returns with a
loading of bi,i=1,2. In a stable period, the idiosyncratic factors represent potentially diversiﬁable
non-systemic risk. In the special case where a1 = a2 = 0, the markets are driven entirely by their
respective idiosyncratic factors8
3.2.2 Data-generating processes for a crisis period
TheDGPforacrisisperiodisanextensionoftheDGPforthestableperiodin(11)-(15)byallowing
for increases in asset-return volatility resulting from an additional propagation mechanism caused
by contagion. Later, this DGP for the crisis period is further extended to allow for structural breaks
in the idiosyncratic factors. To distinguish it from the stable period, returns in the crisis period are
denoted as yi,t,i = 1,2. The DGP during the crisis period is speciﬁed as
y1,t = a1zt +b1u1,t, (16)
y2,t = a2zt +b2u2,t +λb1u1,t, (17)
where zt is speciﬁed as in (13), and (14). Contagion is deﬁned as shocks originating in country 1,
b1u1,t = y1,t −b1zt, which impact upon the asset returns of country 2, over and above the contri-
bution of the systematic factor a2zt and the country’s idiosyncratic factor b2u2,t. The strength of
contagion is determined by the parameter λ. λ = 0 represents no contagion and is used to examine
the size properties of the test statistic. The values of λ>0 are used to examine the power properties
of the test statistic.
3.2.3 Analysis of the covariance structure
The design in our Monte Carlo simulations can capture some of the key empirical features of ﬁnan-
cial crises. To highlight these properties, we consider the variance-covariance matrices of the two
8Theassumptionthattheidiosyncraticfactorsareidenticallydistributedcanberelaxedbyincludingautocorrelation
and conditional volatility in the form of GARCH; see, for example, Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005).
14sample periods: the stable period and the crisis period, respectively. Based on the independence
assumption of the common factor and idiosyncratic factor, the variance-covariance matrix during




































When there is no structural break (r = 1), there is no increase in volatility in the country that was
the source of the crisis. In this case, any increase in the volatility of y2t (asset returns) in country 2












This expression indicates that volatility can increase for two reasons: an increase in volatility in
the systemic factor a2
2(r2−1)+λ2b2
1 and an increase in volatility arising from contagion λ2b2
1.
3.2.4 Experimental design
The DGPs used in the Monte Carlo experiments are based on the equations (9)-(15). The cri-
sis period is characterized by contagion from y1,t to y2,t. The crisis period allows for structural
breaks in the idiosyncratic factor of y1,t. We consider two scenarios for the transmission of ﬁnan-
cial contagion. One is the linear transmission mechanism of ﬁnancial contagion, and the other is
the non-linear. For both scenarios, we consider three cases.
15We assume that during stable periods,
x1,t = 0.6zt +0.3u1,t, (22)
x2,t = 0.2zt +0.4u2,t. (23)
For the linear transmission mechanism of ﬁnancial contagion, during the crisis period, the DGPs
are speciﬁed as follows:
y1,t = 0.6zt +0.3u1,t, (24)
y2,t = 0.2zt +0.4u2,t +λ(0.3u1,t). (25)
However, for the non-linear transmission mechanism of ﬁnancial contagion, during the crisis pe-
riod, the DGPs are speciﬁed as follows:
y1,t = 0.6zt +0.3u1,t, (26)
y2,t = 0.2zt +0.4u2,t +λ(0.3u1,t)2sign(0.3u1,t), (27)





1 if x > 0
0 if x = 0
−1 if x < 0.
We assume that there are structural breaks in the idiosyncratic factor of y1,t. To examine
the performance of our test when there is contagion, we allow the shocks to follow three dis-
tributions, and for the following cases 1-3, the parameters in common factor zt are chosen as
(ρ,α,β) = (0.5,0.25,0.4). Forbes and Rigobon (2002) use a uniform distribution to show how
heteroskedasticity can bias cross-market correlation coefﬁcients. In case 1, we follow Forbes and
Rigobon and use a uniform distribution as an idiosyncratic shock. In case 2, a normal distribution
is used to model the distribution of an idiosyncratic shock. To capture the possibility of fat tails in
16a market return distribution, we use a t-distribution to model an idiosyncratic shock. In case 4, we
use an ARCH model to model the distribution of an idiosyncratic shock.
Case 1. For the stable period, u1,t and u2,t are uniformly distributed between −1 and 1; i.e.,
u1,t = Uniform(−1,1), and u2,t = Uniform(−1,1). For the crisis period, u1,t is uniformly dis-
tributed between −10 and 10; i.e., u1,t = Uniform(−10,10), and u2,t = Uniform(−1,1). The
strength of contagion is set at λ = 0,0.01,0.1,0.2. λ = 0 is used to examine the size properties of
our test, while λ = 0.01,0.1,0.2 are used to examine the power properties of our test.
Case 2. For the stable period, u1,t and u2,t are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
1; i.e., u1,t = N(0,1) and u2,t = N(0,1). For the crisis period, u1,t = N(0,3), and u2,t = N(0,1).
Case 3. For the stable period, u1,t and u2,t have t-distributions; i.e., u1,t =t(3), and u2,t =t(3).
For the crisis period, u1,t =t(1), and u2,t =t(3).
Case 4. The common factor is assumed as zt ∼ N(0,1). For the stable period, u1t =
√
htεt,εt ∼
N(0,1),ht = 0.25+0.4(u1t)2, and u2t = 0.5u2,t−1 +εt,εt ∼ N(0,1). For the crisis period, u1t =
√
htεt,εt ∼ N(0,1),ht = 5(0.25+0.4(u1t)2), and u2t = 0.5u2,t−1+εt,εt ∼ N(0,1).
Throughout the experiment, we simulate 1,000 data sets of the random sample at daily fre-
quency. The sample sizes for the stable periods are set as n=250 and n=500, respectively, which
correspond to about one and two years of daily data. The sample sizes for the crisis period are set
as m = 30, and m = 60, respectively, which correspond to about one and two months of daily data.
Tables 1 and 2 report the estimated sizes and powers of our test when the ﬁnancial contagion
is transmitted by a linear transmission mechanism. Table 1 shows the results for when the stable
period is longer than the crisis period, while Table 2 shows the results for when the crisis period is
longer than the stable period. For comparison, under the same simulation designs, the simulation
results of FR’s test (2002) are also reported in Table 1 and Table 2. The size performance of our
17test is based on simulating the model under the null hypothesis of no contagion by setting λ = 0.
We consider the empirical rejection rates using the asymptotic critical value, −1.65, at the 5 per
cent level.
It is clear that, under the same simulation setting, FR’s test yields low sizes. FR’s test is
consistently undersized for all experiments, with the test not rejecting the null of no contagion
often enough. The result that FR’s test is undersized is consistent with much of the empirical
literature, which ﬁnds little evidence of contagion when using this test.
Since contagion is assumed to transfer from country 1 (y1,t) to country 2 (y2,t) during the
crisis period, the power of the test should increase as the λ increases. Our test has good power
in detecting ﬁnancial contagion. For a given contagion, the estimated power of our test always
increases rapidly with respect to the strength of the ﬁnancial contagion (λ) for all three cases. For
example, when the strength of contagion λ increases from 0.01 to 0.1, the power of our test (in
case 1) increases from 13.1 per cent to 99.4 per cent. In contrast, the estimated power of FR’s test
is zero when λ = 0.01,0.1. Overall, for cases 1 to 4, FR’s test exhibits quite low power, suggesting
that their test tends not to ﬁnd evidence of contagion when it does exist, which in turn indicates
that the strong empirical evidence of “no contagion, only interdependece” obtained by FR’s test is
potentially spurious.
Tables 3 and 4 report the simulation results when the ﬁnancial crisis is transformed by a non-
linear function (λ(0.3u1,t)2sign(0.3u1,t)). Our test has reasonable size performance for all four
cases in Table 3. The estimated size for case 4 in Table 4 underestimates the nominal size. In
contrast, FR’s test still shows quite a low size. A possible reason for the low size is the arbitrary
and unrealistic restrictions on the variance of country-speciﬁc shocks in FR’s test. Our test is more
powerful than FR’s test for all cases.
184 Empirical Evidence of International Financial Contagion Ef-
fects in the Canadian Banking System
As noted earlier, ﬁnancial crises can be transmitted either through channels that exist only in crisis
periods (unstable linkages; i.e., ﬁnancial contagion exists) or through channels that exist in both
crisis and stable periods (stable linkages; i.e., ﬁnancial contagion does not exist). From the pol-
icy perspective of preserving ﬁnancial stability, it is important to discriminate between these two
alternative transmission mechanisms. Since banks play a central role in the payments system, the
ﬁnancing of investment and growth, and the credit creation process, we use our test to examine
whether there are contagion effects to the Canadian banking system from recent international ﬁ-
nancial crises, including the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, the 1997
East Asian crisis, and the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis. The stock returns of Canadian banks are
used to measure the banks’s vulnerability to a ﬁnancial crisis.
As in Forbes (2001), and Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2005), a stock return is chosen
as an indicator to investigate whether there exists contagion for several reasons. First, since stock
returns are measured at a much high frequency, they can more accurately pinpoint the effects of
a speciﬁc crisis and are available for a large sample of countries. Second, since stock returns
incorporate the immediate impact of a crisis as well as its expected longer-term effects, stock
returns should capture the total impact of a crisis on a particular country. Third, the choice of
bank stock prices for measuring banking system risk is also motivated by Merton’s (1974) option-
theoretic framework toward default. This approach has played an important role in risk analysis.
We use daily data on the stock prices of Canada’s six largest commercial banks9 and on the
stock market indexes of six Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Phillippines,
9The six largest commercial banks by asset size (the big six) are the Bank of Montreal (BMO), CIBC, National
Bank (NAT), RBC Financial Group (RBC), Scotiabank (BNS), and TD Bank Financial Group (TD).
19and Thailand), G-7 countries, and four Latin American countries (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile). The stock price returns and stock market indexes are constructed by 100 times the differ-
ence in the log of the stock prices and indexes. All data are from Datastream.
4.1 Contagion from the 1987 U.S. stock market crash
For the ﬁrst empirical analysis of our test, we consider the ﬁnancial crisis caused by the 1987
U.S. stock market crash, which has been extensively discussed over the past decade. However,
the empirical evidence of contagion remains mixed. For example, King and Wadhwani(1990) test
for an increase in stock market correlation between the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Japan, and ﬁnd that cross-market correlations increased signiﬁcantly after the U.S. stock market
crash of 1987. Using a heteroskedasticity-adjusted test, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that little
evidence of contagion can be found for the 1987 crisis.
Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we deﬁne the crisis period as 17 October 1987 (the date
the crash began) through 4 December 1987, and deﬁne the stable period as 1 January 1986 through
16 October 1987. The asymptotic critical value at the 5 per cent level is −1.645. Any test statistic
less than this critical value indicates contagion, while any test statistic greater than or equal to this
value indicates no contagion. Table 5 reports estimated Kendall’s tau correlation coefﬁcients for
both the stable and crisis periods, test statistics from our contagion test, and our results.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 5. First, our test shows that there is a signiﬁcant
increase in the linkages from the U.S. stock market to each of the Candian big six banks during the
crisis period, indicating that there is strong evidence of contagion from this crisis to each of the big
six banks. Also, the linkages between U.S. and Canadian stock markets increased signiﬁcantly,
suggesting that contagion occurred in the Canadian stock market. Prior to the crisis in the U.S.
stock market, even though returns were not tightly correlated with the stock market returns in
20France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Korea, and Malaysia (in fact,
there was a negative relationship with Malaysia), the sharp increases in co-movements with these
countries after the crisis provides sufﬁcient evidence that they experienced ﬁnancial contagion
from the 1987 U.S. stock market crash. Overall, our test indicates that, after the crash in the U.S.
stock market, contagion occurred in the Candian big six banks, as well as in France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Korea, and Malaysia.10
Table6reportstheempiricalresultsofFR’stest. Incontrastwithourresults, FR’sheteroskedasticity-
adjusted test indicates that the correlations between the U.S. stock market and Canadian banks,
with the exception of CIBC, decreased, suggesting that these banks did not experience ﬁnancial
contagion from the U.S. stock market crash. In the crisis period, though we observe increases in
correlations between the United States and several countries, with the exception of Canada, and
Hong Kong, none of these increases were signiﬁcant enough to support a conclusion that contagion
effects occurred in these countries. Based on the fact that FR’s test is built on arbitrary assumptions
on the variance of the country-speciﬁc noise in the market in which the crisis originates, and the
empirical ﬁndings from our test, we strongly question the empirical results of FR’s test.
4.2 Contagion from the 1994 Mexican peso crisis
In December 1994, the Mexican government suffered a balance-of-payments crisis, which led to a
devaluationofthepesoandaprecipitousdeclineintheMexicanstockmarket. Thiscrisisgenerated
fears that contagion could quickly lead to crises in other emerging markets, especially in the rest
of Latin America. Following the literature, we deﬁne the crisis period in the Mexican market as
lasting from 19 December 1994 (the day the exchange rate regime was abandoned) through 31
December 1994. The stable period is deﬁned as 1 January 1993 through 18 December 1994.
10Since many of the smaller stock markets were not in existence during the crisis, we focus on the 10 largest stock
markets.
21Table 7 reports our empirical results. The co-movements between Canadian banks and the
Mexican stock market are low during the stable period and decrease during the crisis period, sug-
gesting that the co-movements between Canadian banks and the Mexican stock market fell during
the period of ﬁnancial crisis. Speciﬁcally, the linkages between RBC and TD are negative during
the crisis period, indicating that these two banks showed discordance with this ﬁnancial crisis.
Overall, the empirical results of our test reveal that the crisis did not cause contagion in Canadian
banking system.
Cross-market linkages between Mexico and other countries in the Latin American region in-
creased sharply during the crisis period. This is a prerequisite for contagion to occur. Our test
shows that the increases were signiﬁcant, suggesting that Argentia, Brazil, and Chile experienced
ﬁnancial contagion from the Mexican stock market crisis of December 1994. The linkages between
Mexico and East Asian countries were weakly related during the stable period, while becoming
negatively linked during the crisis period, indicating that the ﬁnancial crisis was not transmitted to
the East Asian countries.
Even though the Mexican stock market had positive linkages with Canada, the United States,
and Italy during both the crisis and stable periods, the linkages became weaker during the crisis
period. Clearly, no ﬁnancial contagion occurred from the Mexican market to the United States,
Canada, and Italy. The Mexican stock market displayed negative linkages with France, Germany,
Japan, and the United Kingdom. Contagion did not occur from the Mexican market to these coun-
tries.
Overall, the empirical results reveal clear evidence that the 1994 Mexican peso crisis is char-
acterized by a regional pattern; i.e., the contagious effects of this crisis were limited to the Latin
American region. The empirical results of FR’s test are reported in Table 8; they indicate that there
22is no evidence of contagion occurring from Mexico to any other country, including the Canadian
banking system.
4.3 Contagion from the 1997 East Asian Crisis
We next consider the East Asian crisis of 1997. The difﬁculty in testing for contagion during this
period is that no single event acts as a clear catalyst for this crisis. For example, the Thai market
declined sharply in June, the Indonesian market fell in August, and the Hong Kong market crashed
in mid-October. Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we focus on testing for contagion from
Hong Kong to the rest of the world during the volatile period directly after the Hong Kong crash.
The October decline in the Hong Kong market is used as the base for our contagion test. The crisis
period is therefore deﬁned as one month starting on 17 October 1997 (the start of the visible Hong
Kong stock market crash), and the stable period as 1 January 1996 through 16 October 1997.
Table 9 reports the empirical results of our test. The linkages between Hong Kong and Cana-
dian banks during the crisis period are larger than those during the stable period. CIBC, BMO,
NAT, and TD display signiﬁcant increases in co-movements with the Hong Kong stock market, in-
dicating that the four banks suffer ﬁnancial contagion from this crisis. Even though we can observe
increases in co-movements between Hong Kong stock market and BNS and RBC, these increases
are not signiﬁcant, indicating that no contagion occurred to BNS and RBC from this ﬁnancial
crisis.
Cross-market linkages between Hong Kong and most countries increased during the crisis pe-
riod. In particular, the signiﬁcant increases in co-movements with most of the East Asian countries,
with the exception of Thailand, provide evidence of contagion to these countries. During the sta-
ble period, Hong Kong stock market had weak linkages with Latin American countries and G-7
countries, but during the crisis period the linkages with these countries increased signiﬁcantly, sug-
23gesting that contagion occurred from Hong Kong to these countries. In contrast, Table 10 reports
the empirical results of FR’s test. Only one coefﬁcient (for Italy) increases signiﬁcantly during the
crisis period. In fact, FR’s adjusted correlations show that the correlations for the crisis period are
lower than those of the stable period.
4.4 Contagion from the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis
The ongoing subprime crisis began in mid-2007. On 15 August 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average dropped below 13,000 and the S&P 500 crossed into negative territory for that year.
Similar drops occurred in virtually every market in the world. Little empirical work has been
undertaken on the ongoing subprime crisis, except for Dungey et al. (2007), who focus on the
second moments of the crisis by examining a factor structure. Following Dungey et al., we deﬁne
the stable period as 2 January 2007 through 31 July 2007. The crisis period is ﬁrst deﬁned as the
three months starting 1 August 2007. We then extend that crisis period by changing its end date
from 1 November 1 2007 to 23 September 2008, to examine the persistency of the crisis.
Table 11 reports the empirical results of our test for the three months starting 1 August 2007.
Table 11 shows that Canadian banks experienced sharp increases in co-movements with the U.S.
stock market following the ongoing subprime crisis. Indeed, these increases are signiﬁcant even
at 1 per cent signiﬁcant level (the asymptotic critical value at 1 per cent is −2.33), suggesting that
there was ﬁnancial contagion from the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis to Canadian banks during
the period of crisis (three months starting on 1 August 2007). On average, the test statistic value
in the case of the ongoing subprime crisis is −7.552, which is lower than in the case of the 1987
U.S. stock market crash and the 1997 East Asian crisis by 28.21 per cent and 84.33 per cent,
respectively, implying that the intensity of the 2007 subprime crisis is stronger.
However, in comparison with the 1987 U.S. stock market crash and the 1997 East Asian ﬁnan-
24cial crisis, there is much less evidence of contagion from the 2007 U.S. subprime crisis in Asian
countries. Financial contagion occurred only in Korea’s stock market, whereas the cross-market
linkages between the U.S. stock market and other Asian countries even decline during the crisis
period. There are two possible explanations for this reduction in contagion during the ongoing
subprime crisis. First, investors retrenched from these markets after the series of crises since 1987,
causing signiﬁcant changes in the countries’ international ﬁnancial structures. In particular, com-
mercial banks substantially reduced their volume of short-term loans to these markets, reducing the
risks from banks withdrawing their credit during future crises. Second, these markets undertook
reforms to improve their economic fundamentals, thereby reducing their vulnerability to a crisis.
The cross-market linkages between the U.S. stock market and G-7 countries, with the exception
of France, have increased signiﬁcantly during the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis, suggesting that
there has been ﬁnancial contagion in these countries from the 2007 U.S. subprime crisis. The
empirical results show that contagion has occurred in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, while there is
no evidence of contagion in Argentina. Table 12 reports the empirical results of FR’s test, which
suggests that there is no evidence of contagion from the ongoing U.S. subprime crisis to any other
country, including the Canadian banking system.
To further examine the persistent contagion impact on the Canadian banking system, we pro-
long the crisis period by changing the end date from 1 November 2007 to 23 September 2008.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 report the empirical results of our test and FR’s test, respectively. Figure 1
shows that our test statistic values are always below the critical value of −1.645, providing solid
evidence that Canadian banks increase signiﬁcantly in co-movements with the U.S. stock market
when the end date of crisis period changes from 1 November 2007 to 23 September 2008. This
indicates that Canadian banks have been experiencing contagion from the ongoing 2007 subprime
25crisis. Figure 2 shows that as usual, FR’s test could not provide empirical evidence of contagion to
Canadian banks from this crisis.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a non-parametric method to test ﬁnancial contagion. The Monte Carlo simu-
lation results suggest that the overall performance of the test is satisfactory. The test is applied to
investigate contagion from a variety of recent ﬁnancial crises to the Canadian banking system. The
empirical results reveal that there existed ﬁnancial contagion to the Canadian banking system from
the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, the 1997 East Asian crisis, and the ongoing 2007 subprime cri-
sis, while the 1994 Mexican peso crisis did not have a contagious impact on the Canadian banking
system. During the period of the subprime crisis, the average test statistic value is −7.552, which
is lower than in the case of the 1987 U.S. stock market crash and the 1997 East Asian crisis by
28.21 per cent and 84.33 per cent, respectively, implying that the intensity of the 2007 subprime
crisis is stronger. We also ﬁnd strong evidence that the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis has more
persistent impacts on the Canadian banking system.
26Table 1: Percentage Rejections of the H0 and Contagion=λ(0.3u1,t)(n > m)
CTn,m FR’s test
λ = 0 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2 λ = 0 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2
n = 250 m = 30
Case 1 0.061 0.131 0.994 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.182
Case 2 0.055 0.235 0.913 1.000 0.000 0.020 0.091 0.473
Case 3 0.072 0.252 0.764 0.948 0.022 0.051 0.287 0.508
Case 4 0.079 0.104 0.294 0.591 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051
n = 500 m = 60
Case 1 0.057 0.172 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.193
Case 2 0.060 0.279 0.983 1.000 0.000 0.010 0.121 0.703
Case 3 0.062 0.376 0.818 0.981 0.029 0.091 0.354 0.772
Case 4 0.035 0.087 0.301 0.670 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091
The table reports the estimated size and power of the contagion test CTn,m, and Forbes and Rigobon’s
test (FR’s test). The nominal size of the tests is set at 5% based on the asymptotic distribution.
The data-generating process (DGP) for the stable period is designed as:
x1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t, where wt = 0.5wt−1+εt,and εt =
√
ht.vt,ht = 1+0.5(εt−1)2
+0.4ht−1,vt = N(0,1). The DGP for the crisis period is designed as: y1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t,y2,t =
0.2wt +0.4u2,t +λ(0.3u1t). Case 1: for the stable period, u1,t and u2,t are uniformly distributed.
For the crisis period, u1,t is uniformly distributed between −10 and 10, and u2,t is uniformly
distributed between −1 and 1. Case 2: For the stable period, u1,t = N(0,1) and u2,t = N(0,1).
For the crisis period, u1,t = N(0,3) and u2,t = N(0,1). Case 3: for the stable period, u1,t =t(3),
u2,t =t(3). For the crisis period, u1,t =t(1) and u2,t =t(3).
Case 4: The common factor zt = N(0,1). For stable period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1), and
ht = 0.25+0.4(u1,t)2). For the crisis period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1),ht = 5(0.25+0.4(u1,t)2),
and u2,t = 0.5u2,t−1+εt,εt = N(0,1).
27Table 2: Percentage Rejections of the H0 and Contagion=λ(0.3u1,t)(n < m)
CTn,m FR’s test
λ = 0 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2 λ = 0 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2
n = 120 m = 250
Case 1 0.032 0.074 0.999 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Case 2 0.049 0.086 0.903 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Case 3 0.076 0.148 0.742 0.955 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.014
Case 4 0.031 0.047 0.185 0.534 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011
n = 250 m = 250
Case 1 0.009 0.044 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Case 2 0.042 0.101 0.981 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Case 3 0.035 0.105 0.887 0.998 0.000 0.002 0.013 0.481
Case 4 0.013 0.044 0.201 0.586 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table reports the estimated size and power of the contagion test CTn,m, and Forbes and Rigobon’s
test (FR’s test). The nominal size of the tests is set at 5% based on the asymptotic distribution.
The data-generating process (DGP) for the stable period is designed as:
x1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t, where wt = 0.5wt−1+εt, and εt =
√
ht.vt,ht = 1+0.5(εt−1)2
+0.4ht−1,vt = N(0,1). The DGP for the crisis period is designed as: y1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t,y2,t =
0.2wt +0.4u2,t +λ(0.3u1t). Case 1: for the stable period, u1,t and u2,t are uniformly distributed.
For the crisis period, u1,t is uniformly distributed between −10 and 10, and u2,t is uniformly
distributed between −1 and 1. Case 2: For the stable period, u1,t = N(0,1) and u2,t = N(0,1).
For the crisis period, u1,t = N(0,3) and u2,t = N(0,1). Case 3: for the stable period, u1,t =t(3),
u2,t =t(3). For the crisis period, u1,t =t(1) and u2,t =t(3).
Case 4: The common factor zt = N(0,1). For stable period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1),and
ht = 0.25+0.4(u1,t)2). For the crisis period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1),ht = 5(0.25+0.4(u1,t)2),
and u2,t = 0.5u2,t−1+εt,εt = N(0,1).
28Table 3: Percentage Rejections of the H0 and Contagion=λ(0.3u1,t)2sign(0.3u1,t)(n > m)
CTn,m FR’s test
λ = 0 λ = 0.001 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.05 λ = 0 λ = 0.001 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.05
n = 250 m = 30
Case 1 0.063 0.284 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.189 0.875
Case 2 0.067 0.312 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.011 0.439 0.945
Case 3 0.060 0.467 0.845 1.000 0.026 0.151 0.347 0.731
Case 4 0.070 0.073 0.361 0.965 0.000 0.010 0.031 0.763
n = 500 m = 60
Case 1 0.054 0.297 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.228 0.986
Case 2 0.071 0.327 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.013 0.557 0.972
Case 3 0.069 0.507 0.912 1.000 0.020 0.217 0.406 0.845
Case 4 0.064 0.071 0.450 1.000 0.000 0.013 0.027 0.921
The table reports the estimated size and power of the contagion test (CTn,m), and Forbes and Rigobon’s
test (FR’s test). The nominal size of the tests is set at 5% based on the asymptotic distribution.
The data-generating process (DGP) for the noncrisis period is designed as:
x1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t, where wt = 0.5wt−1+εt,and εt =
√
ht.vt,ht = 1+0.5(εt−1)2
+0.4ht−1,vt = N(0,1). The DGP for the crisis period is designed as: y1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t,y2,t =
0.2wt +0.4u2,t +λ(0.3u1t)2sign(0.3u1,t). Case 1: for the stable period, u1,t and u2,t are
uniformly distributed. For the crisis period, u1,t is uniformly distributed between −10 and 10,
and u2,t is uniformly distributed between −1 and 1. Case 2: For the stable period, u1,t = N(0,1)
and for the crisis period u1,t = N(0,3), and u2,t = N(0,1). Case 3: for the stable period, u1,t =t(3),
Case 4: The common factor zt = N(0,1). For stable period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1),and
ht = 0.25+0.4(u1,t)2). For the crisis period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1),ht = 5(0.25+0.4(u1,t)2),
and u2,t = 0.5u2,t−1+εt,εt = N(0,1).
29Table 4: Percentage Rejections of the H0 and Contagion=λ(0.3u1,t)2sign(0.3u1,t)(n < m)
CTn,m FR’s Test
λ = 0 λ = 0.001 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.05 λ = 0 λ = 0.001 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.05
n = 120 m = 250
Case 1 0.027 0.164 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Case 2 0.051 0.153 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Case 3 0.067 0.323 0.902 1.000 0.003 0.035 0.042 0.073
Case 4 0.012 0.025 0.237 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.512
n = 250 m = 250
Case 1 0.012 0.186 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Case 2 0.037 0.196 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
Case 3 0.071 0.473 0.977 1.000 0.000 0.033 0.047 0.049
Case 4 0.005 0.017 0.267 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.853
The table reports the estimated size and power of the contagion test (CTn,m), and Forbes and Rigobon’s
test (FR’s test). The nominal size of the tests is set at 5% based on the asymptotic distribution.
The data-generating process (DGP) for the stable period is designed as:
x1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t, where wt = 0.5wt−1+εt,and εt =
√
ht.vt,ht = 1+0.5(εt−1)2
+0.4ht−1,vt = N(0,1). The DGP for the crisis period is designed as: y1,t = 0.6wt +0.3u1,t,y2,t =
0.2wt +0.4u2,t +λ(0.3u1t)2sign(0.3u1,t). Case 1: for the noncrisis period, u1,t and u2,t are
uniformly distributed. For the crisis period, u1,t is uniformly distributed between −10 and 10,
and u2,t is uniformly distributed between −1 and 1. Case 2: For the stable period, u1,t = N(0,1)
and for the crisis period u1,t = N(0,3), and u2,t = N(0,1). Case 3: for the stable period, u1,t =t(3),
Case 4: The common factor zt = N(0,1). For stable period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1),and
ht = 0.25+0.4(u1,t)2). For the crisis period, u1,t =
√
htεt,εt = N(0,1),ht = 5(0.25+0.4(u1,t)2),
and u2,t = 0.5u2,t−1+εt,εt = N(0,1).
30Table 5: 1987 U.S. Stock Market Crash
Stable period Crisis period
ˆ ρxy στ ˆ ρh
xy στ CTn,m Result
CIBC 0.135 0.032 0.401 0.122 −8.272 C
BMO 0.165 0.031 0.228 0.132 −2.051 C
NAT 0.159 0.030 0.463 0.119 −9.997 C
BNS 0.160 0.031 0.292 0.124 −4.322 C
RBC 0.162 0.033 0.247 0.133 −2.668 C
TD 0.145 0.032 0.401 0.131 −8.033 C
Canada 0.385 0.027 0.656 0.103 −10.008 C
France 0.096 0.050 0.510 0.093 −8.274 C
Germany 0.052 0.048 0.362 0.126 −6.349 C
Italy 0.078 0.049 0.215 0.153 −2.799 C
Japan 0.092 0.028 0.438 0.122 −12.25 C
U.K. 0.139 0.046 0.550 0.116 −9.035 C
Hong Kong 0.024 0.032 0.081 0.129 −1.759 C
Korea 0.027 0.030 0.142 0.168 −3.849 C
Malaysia −0.019 0.032 0.472 0.136 −15.445 C
This table reports the values of the CTn,m test statistics to detect the contagion
from the 1987 U.S. stock market crash to the Canadian big six bank, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and United Kindom. The estimations of
concordance before and after the crisis are also reported. The stable period is
deﬁned as 1 January 1986 through 16 October 1987. The crisis period is deﬁned
as one month starting on 17 October 1987 through 4 December 1987. “C” in
the ﬁnal column indicates that the contagion test (CTn,m) is greater than
the critical value and that therefore contagion occurred. “N” in the ﬁnal column
indicates that no contagion occurred.
31Table 6: 1987 U.S. Stock Market Crash
Stable period Crisis period
ρ σ ρad σ FR’s Test Result
CIBC 0.131 2.863 0.276 3.371 −2.269 C
BMO 0.222 1.281 0.106 2.161 1.993 N
NAT 0.279 1.418 0.207 4.504 1.220 N
BNS 0.286 1.564 0.136 3.015 2.607 N
RBC 0.169 1.778 0.084 3.415 1.515 N
TD 0.247 1.392 0.163 3.065 1.443 N
Canada 0.600 0.681 0.273 3.598 6.003 N
France 0.110 1.114 0.196 3.815 −1.044 N
Germany 0.040 1.214 0.133 3.503 −1.135 N
Italy 0.074 1.029 0.120 2.649 −0.571 N
Japan 0.201 1.053 0.043 3.689 0.967 N
UK 0.180 0.819 0.189 3.667 −0.105 N
Hong Kong 0.041 1.113 −0.001 7.450 0.722 N
Korea 0.003 1.323 0.026 1.815 −0.3971 N
Malaysia 0.019 1.441 0.176 5.246 −2.942 C
This table reports the values of FR test statistics to detect the contagion
from the 1987 U.S. stock market crash to the Canadian big six bank, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and United Kindom. The estimations of
concordance before and after the crisis are also reported. The stable period is
deﬁned as 1 January 1986 through 16 October 1987. The crisis period is deﬁned
as one month starting on 17 October 1987 through 4 December 1987. “C” in
the ﬁnal column indicates that the FR’s test is greater than the critical value
and that therefore contagion occurred. “N” in the ﬁnal column indicates
that no contagion occurred.
32Table 7: 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis
Stable period Crisis period
ˆ ρxy στ ˆ ρh
xy στ CTn,m Result
CIBC 0.075 0.030 0.008 0.099 2.204 N
BMO 0.091 0.029 0.002 0.113 3.054 N
NAT 0.058 0.028 0.054 0.093 0.132 N
BNS 0.089 0.030 0.007 0.096 2.792 N
RBC 0.116 0.029 −0.002 0.097 4.095 N
TD 0.129 0.030 −0.012 0.104 4.754 N
Canada 0.167 0.029 0.061 0.094 3.622 N
France 0.088 0.030 −0.100 0.104 6.306 N
Germany 0.089 0.028 −0.100 0.115 6.403 N
Italy 0.041 0.031 0.029 0.099 0.348 N
Japan −0.052 0.030 −0.089 0.115 1.215 N
U.K. 0.145 0.029 −0.025 0.100 5.887 N
U.S. 0.167 0.030 0.051 0.129 3.941 N
Argentina 0.187 0.029 0.496 0.079 −10.605 C
Brazil 0.102 0.031 0.484 0.084 −12.420 C
Chile 0.143 0.030 0.421 0.090 −9.270 C
Hong Kong 0.060 0.031 −0.115 0.102 5.713 N
Indonesia 0.074 0.030 −0.053 0.109 4.158 N
Korea 0.111 0.070 −0.118 0.103 7.736 N
Malaysia 0.075 0.029 −0.069 0.099 4.915 N
Philippines 0.131 0.030 −0.070 0.114 6.709 N
This table reports the values of the CTn,m test statistics to detect the contagion from
the 1994 Mexican peso crisis to the Canadian big six banks, the countries of East
Asian, Latin America, and G-7. The estimations of concordance before and
after the crisis are also reported. The stable period is deﬁned as 1 January 1993
through 18 December 1994. The crisis period is deﬁned as 19 December 1994
through 31 December 1994. “C” in the ﬁnal column indicates that FR’s test is
greater than the critical value and that therefore contagion occurred. “N” in the
ﬁnal column indicates that no contagion occurred.
33Table 8: 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis
Stable period Crisis period
ρ σ ρad σ FR’s Test Result
CIBC 0.053 1.127 0.013 1.141 0.908 N
BMO 0.026 1.164 0.006 1.196 2.238 N
NAT −0.003 1.495 −0.001 1.865 1.346 N
BNS 0.035 1.297 0.008 1.449 1.903 N
RBC −0.019 1.228 −0.005 1.187 2.669 N
TD −0.026 1.357 −0.006 1.302 3.006 N
Canada 0.104 0.661 0.025 0.653 4.133 N
France 0.133 0.967 −0.009 0.897 2.505 N
Germany 0.122 1.001 −0.040 0.660 2.857 N
Italy 0.065 1.481 0.012 1.438 0.934 N
Japan −0.068 1.029 −0.044 1.245 −0.409 N
U.K. 0.221 0.638 −0.004 0.512 4.051 N
U.S. 0.234 0.568 0.032 0.394 3.606 N
Hong Kong 0.090 1.656 −0.012 1.770 1.759 N
Indonesia 0.123 1.493 −0.023 1.656 2.574 N
Korea 0.161 1.141 −0.033 1.501 3.453 N
Malaysia 0.067 1.437 −0.005 1.769 1.273 N
Philippines 0.195 1.612 −0.028 1.914 3.993 N
Argentina 0.303 1.763 0.175 3.504 2.268 N
Brazil 0.177 3.352 0.202 4.304 −0.427 N
Chile 0.233 1.061 0.171 1.926 1.079 N
This table reports the values of FR’s test statistics to detect the contagion from
the 1994 Mexican peso crisis to the Canadian big six banks, the countries of East
Asian, Latin America, and G-7. The cross-market correlation coefﬁcients and
standard deviations are also reported. The cross-market correlation coefﬁcients of
the crisis period are adjusted from Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The stable period
is deﬁned as 1 January 1993 through 18 December 1994. The crisis period is
deﬁned as 19 December 1994 through 31 December 1994. “C” in the ﬁnal column
indicates that FR’s test is greater than the critical value and that therefore
contagion occurred. “N” in the ﬁnal column indicates that no contagion occurred.
34Table 9: Testing for Financial Contagion for the 1997 East Asian Crisis
Stable period Crisis period
ˆ ρxy στ ˆ ρh
xy στ CTn,m Result
CIBC 0.096 0.033 0.265 0.179 −5.162 C
BMO 0.065 0.031 0.240 0.169 −5.679 C
NAT 0.069 0.031 0.375 0.170 −9.989 C
BNS 0.078 0.031 0.100 0.167 −0.717 N
RBC 0.098 0.030 0.115 0.177 −0.556 N
TD 0.084 0.031 0.160 0.173 −2.447 C
Canada 0.156 0.031 0.331 0.189 −5.576 C
France 0.099 0.032 0.490 0.131 −12.043 C
Germany 0.190 0.033 0.570 0.155 −11.498 C
Italy 0.129 0.031 0.485 0.146 −11.354 C
Japan 0.172 0.03 0.345 0.158 −5.764 C
U.K. 0.154 0.033 0.600 0.124 −13.554 C
U.S. 0.076 0.031 0.225 0.199 −4.788 C
Argentina 0.056 0.032 0.140 0.181 −2.629 C
Brazil 0.070 0.033 0.200 0.185 −3.912 C
Chile 0.034 0.032 0.285 0.173 −7.771 C
Mexico 0.118 0.032 0.295 0.192 −5.475 C
Hong Kong 0.026 0.049 0.159 0.100 −2.708 C
Indonesia 0.167 0.033 0.250 0.168 −2.544 C
Korea 0.061 0.031 0.115 0.188 −1.771 C
Malaysia 0.195 0.032 0.335 0.171 −4.257 C
Philippines 0.135 0.033 0.430 0.163 −8.942 C
Thailand 0.118 0.034 0.015 0.189 3.066 N
This table reports the values of the CTn,m test statistics to detect the contagion from
the 1997 East Asian crisis to the Canadian big six banks, the countries of East
Asian, Latin American, and the G-7. The estimations of concordance before and
after the crisis are also reported. The stable period is deﬁned as 1 January 1996,
through 16 October 1997. The crisis period is deﬁned as one month starting on
17 October 1997. “C” in the ﬁnal column indicates that the contagion test (CTn,m) is
greater than the critical value and that therefore contagion occurred. “N” in the ﬁnal
column indicates that no contagion occurred.
35Table 10: 1997 East Asian Crisis
Stable period Crisis period
ρ σ ρad σ FR’s test Result
CIBC 0.094 1.289 0.059 2.778 0.548 N
BMO 0.054 1.241 0.049 2.404 0.089 N
NAT 0.055 1.325 0.102 2.514 −0.741 N
BNS 0.089 1.303 0.059 2.345 0.484 N
RBC 0.090 1.232 0.050 1.785 0.643 N
TD 0.069 1.392 0.059 2.309 0.155 N
Canada 0.171 0.581 0.321 1.786 1.696 N
France 0.153 0.957 0.261 2.086 −1.523 N
Germany 0.299 0.898 0.276 2.411 0.330 N
Italy 0.129 1.260 0.253 2.204 −1.776 C
Japan 0.287 0.895 0.136 2.317 2.397 N
U.K. 0.211 0.580 0.286 1.415 −1.047 N
U.S. 0.089 0.806 0.015 2.181 1.179 N
Argentina 0.131 1.377 0.015 5.050 1.881 N
Brazil 0.133 1.660 0.030 6.308 1.667 N
Chile 0.063 0.921 0.098 1.882 −0.540 N
Mexico 0.211 1.307 0.076 5.346 2.187 N
Hong Kong 0.051 1.304 0.003 7.198 0.605 N
Indonesia 0.317 1.876 0.162 4.984 2.439 N
Korea 0.103 1.472 0.035 4.925 1.084 N
Malaysia 0.298 1.569 0.141 3.565 2.495 N
Philippines 0.217 1.726 0.180 3.130 0.563 N
Thailand 0.120 2.548 0.018 6.969 1.641 N
This table reports the values of FR’s test statistics to detect the contagion from
the 1997 East Asian crisis to the Canadian big six banks, the countries of East
Asia, Latin American, and G-7. The cross-market correlation coefﬁcients and
standard deviations are also reported. The cross-market correlation coefﬁcients
of the crisis period is adjusted from Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The stable
period is deﬁned as 1 January 1996, through 16 October 1997. The turmoil
period is deﬁned as one month starting on 17 October 1997. “C” in the ﬁnal
column indicates that FR’s test is greater than the critical value and that therefore
contagion occurred. “N” in the ﬁnal column indicates that no contagion occurred.
36Table 11: Testing for Financial Contagion for the Ongoing 2007 Subprime Crisis
Stable period Crisis period
ˆ ρxy στ ˆ ρh
xy στ CTn,m Result
CIBC 0.186 0.034 0.377 0.113 −5.582 C
BMO 0.194 0.033 0.563 0.107 −10.166 C
NAT 0.152 0.036 0.406 0.135 −7.049 C
BNS 0.202 0.032 0.389 0.112 −5.687 C
RBC 0.187 0.034 0.510 0.108 −9.542 C
TD 0.181 0.035 0.439 0.101 −7.286 C
Canada 0.419 0.029 0.710 0.085 −10.207 C
France 0.073 0.033 −0.110 0.133 5.502 N
Germany 0.325 0.032 0.484 0.120 −5.030 C
Italy 0.332 0.033 0.463 0.120 −3.982 C
Japan 0.331 0.033 0.436 0.126 −3.163 C
U.K. 0.314 0.032 0.465 0.116 −4.769 C
Argentina 0.398 0.028 0.344 0.109 0.182 N
Brazil 0.456 0.028 0.542 0.092 −3.151 C
Chile 0.534 0.025 0.614 0.069 −2.548 C
Mexico 0.401 0.029 0.525 0.102 −3.813 C
Hong Kong 0.122 0.001 0.058 0.003 1.862 C
Indonesia 0.102 0.001 −0.058 0.007 1.035 N
Korea 0.106 0.001 0.142 0.006 −2.647 C
Malaysia 0.021 0.001 −0.054 0.008 2.160 N
Philippines −0.03 0.001 −0.200 0.006 5.105 N
Thailand 0.104 0.001 0.040 0.007 1.846 N
This table reports the values of the CTn,m test statistics to detect the contagion from
the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis to the Canadian big six banks, the countries of East
Asia, Latin American, and G-7. The estimations of concordance before and
after the crisis are also reported. The stable period is deﬁned as 1 January 2007,
through 31 July 2007. The crisis period is deﬁned as three months starting on
1 August 2007. “C” in the ﬁnal column indicates that the contagion test (CTn,m)
test is greater than the critical value and therefore contagion occurred. “N” in the
ﬁnal column indicates that no contagion occurred.
37Table 12: Testing for Financial Contagion for the 2007 Subprime Crisis
Stable period Crisis period
ρ σ ρad σ FR’s Test Result
CIBC 0.295 0.816 0.294 1.827 0.011 N
BMO 0.335 0.807 0.431 1.385 −1.055 N
NAT 0.299 0.870 0.353 1.501 −0.564 N
BNS 0.298 0.872 0.279 1.160 0.200 N
RBC 0.346 0.905 0.406 1.344 −0.658 N
TD 0.352 0.817 0.354 1.427 −0.019 N
Canada 0.662 0.803 0.511 1.215 1.612 N
France 0.119 1.084 −0.125 2.004 2.229 N
Germany 0.509 0.792 0.232 2.008 2.651 N
Italy 0.534 0.909 0.257 1.783 2.658 N
Japan 0.534 0.966 0.290 1.166 2.351 N
U.K. 0.507 0.813 0.223 1.569 2.703 N
Argentina 0.336 1.693 0.247 1.654 0.919 N
Brazil 0.699 1.337 0.493 1.677 2.561 N
Chile 0.751 1.494 0.468 2.111 3.480 N
Mexico 0.633 1.378 0.379 2.302 2.902 N
Hong Kong 0.162 0.966 0.032 2.350 1.985 N
Indonesia 0.157 1.107 −0.032 1.906 2.145 N
Korea 0.084 1.591 0.102 1.579 −0.203 N
Malaysia 0.111 0.729 −0.073 1.230 2.083 N
Philippines 0.001 1.318 −0.098 2.198 1.199 N
Thailand 0.150 0.977 0.008 1.949 1.605 N
This table reports the values of FR’s test statistics to detect the contagion from
the ongoing 2007 subprime crisis to the Canadian big six banks, the countries of East
Asia, Latin American, and the G-7. The cross-market correlation coefﬁcients and
standard deviations are also reported. The cross-market correlation coefﬁcients
of the crisis period is adjusted from Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The stable
period is deﬁned as 1 January 2007, through 31 July 1997. The crisis period
is deﬁned as three months starting on 1 August 2007. “C” in the ﬁnal column
indicates that the FR’s test is grater than the critical value and that therefore
contagion occurred. “N” in the ﬁnal column indicates that no contagion occurred.
38Figure 1: Contagion from the Ongoing 2007 Subprime Crisis (Statistic value of CTn,m)
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39Figure 2: Contagion from the Ongoing 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis (Statistic value of FR)
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